The Resource Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties

Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties

Label
Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties
Title
Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Previous empirical studies have mainly analysed tax competition, neglecting the role of tax cooperation in international taxation. We focus on German double taxation agreements (DTAs) and show for up to 45 tax treaties that the bargaining outcomes depend on investment asymmetries between the countries. A transition from a purely symmetrical country pair to a situation where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in only one direction would increase on average the negotiated withholding tax rate by roughly 5 percentage points. We also show that bargaining over DTAs is not only about withholding tax rates, but also about the definition of a permanent establishment (PE). Our results are robust with regard to the concept of investment asymmetries (either in shares or levels) and different operationalizations (FDI stocks or sales)
Citation source
In: FinanzArchiv. - Tübingen. - Vol. 65 (2009),
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
  • Rixen, T
  • Schwarz, P. (Peter)
Geographic coverage
International
Language note
English
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • tax treaty
  • foreign investment
  • withholding tax
  • PE
Label
Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties
Instantiates
Publication
Label
Bargaining over the avoidance of double taxation : evidence from German tax treaties
Publication

Library Locations

    • IBFD Library AmsterdamBorrow it
      Rietlandpark 301, Amsterdam, 1019 DW, NL
      52.3736660 4.9336932