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The Resource The economics of tax avoidance and evasion

The economics of tax avoidance and evasion

Label
The economics of tax avoidance and evasion
Title
The economics of tax avoidance and evasion
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The articles in this collection give an overview of the economic theory and empirical analyses on tax avoidance and evasion written by the most important economic intellectuals in the period from early 1970s to the recent times. The book is structured as follows: Part I: Pioneering contributions to the theory of tax evasion; Part II: Pioneering empirical studies of tax evasion; Part III: Theories of tax auditing: principal-agent and game-theoretic perspectives; Part IV: Topics in tax administration; Part V:The implications of tax evasion for the theory of optimal taxation; Part VI: Corporate tax evasion: theoretical perspectives; Part VII: Information reporting and the role of intermediaries in tax compliance; Part VIII: Cross-border tax evasion; Part IX: General perspectives on tax avoidance; Part X: Corporate tax avoidance; Part XI: Base erosion and profit shifting by multinational firms; Part XII: Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of taxation; Part XIII: Bunching analysis of tax evasion and avoidance: evidence from notches and kinks; Part XIV: The consequences of tax amnesties and of tax holidays for multinational firms; Part XV: The characteristics of tax havens, and their role in tax avoidance and evasion
Geographic coverage
International
Index
no index present
Language note
English
Literary form
non fiction
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Dharmapala, D
Series statement
The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics
Series volume
334
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • tax avoidance
  • tax evasion
  • tax authorities
  • audit
  • corporate income tax
  • tax compliance
  • base erosion
  • profit shifting
  • MNE
  • tax amnesty
  • tax holiday
  • tax haven
Label
The economics of tax avoidance and evasion
Instantiates
Publication
Contents
  • Introduction
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • ; p. xv-xxix
  • Income tax evasion : a theoretical analysis
  • Allingham, M.G.
  • Sandmo, A.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 1(1972)(3-4), 323-38 ; p. 3-18
  • Tax evasion : a model
  • Srinivasan, T.N.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 2 (1973)(4), 339-46 ; p. 19-26
  • A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
  • Ytzhaki, S.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 3(1974) (2), 201-2 ; p. 27-28
  • Tax evasion and tax rates: an analysis of individual returns
  • Clotfelter, C. T.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV (1983)(3), August, 363-73 ; p. 31-41
  • An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection
  • Feinstein, J.S.
  • RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1991)(1), Spring, 14-35 ; p. 42-63
  • Why do people pay taxes?
  • Alm, J.
  • McClelland, G.H.
  • Schulze, W. D.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 48 (1992)(1), June, 21-38 ; p. 64-81
  • Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit : evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Blumenthal, M.
  • Christian, C.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 79(2001)(3), March, 455-83 ; p. 82-110
  • Do normative appeals affect tax compliance? Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota?
  • Blumenthal, M.
  • Christian, C.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Smith, M.G.
  • National Tax Journal, 54 (2001)(1), March, 125-38 ; p. 111-125
  • Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
  • Reinganum, J.F.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 26(1985)(1), February, 1-18 ; p. 127-144
  • The tax compliance game : toward an interactive theory of law enforcement
  • Graetz, M.J.
  • Reinganum, J.F.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (1986)(1), Spring, 1-32 ; p. 145-176
  • A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement
  • Chander, P.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Review of Economic Studies, 65(1998)(1), January, 165-83 ; p. 177-197
  • The optimal size of a tax collection agency
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Yitzhaki, S.
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89 (1987)(2), June, 183-92 ; p. 199-208
  • Corruption in tax administration
  • Chander, P.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 49 (1992)(3), December, 333-49 ; p. 209-225
  • Tax policy and the missing middle : optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Wilson, J.D.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 95 (2011)(9-10), October, 1036-47 ; p. 226-237
  • Tax farming redux : experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
  • Khan, A.Q.
  • Khwaja, A.I.
  • Olken, B.A.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2016)(1), February, 219-71 ; p. 238-292
  • Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion
  • Kaplow, L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 43 (1990)(2), November, 221-36 ; p. 293-308
  • Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax
  • Cremer, H.
  • Gahvari, F.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 60(1995) (2), May, 235-49 ; p. 309-326
  • Internal control versus external manipulation : a model of corporate income tax evasion
  • Chen, K.-P.
  • Chu, C.Y.C.
  • RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2005)(1), Spring, 151-64 ; p. 327-340
  • Corporate tax evasion with agency costs
  • Crocker, K.J.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 89(2005)(9 -10), September, 1593-610 ; p. 341-360
  • Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Knudsen, M.B.
  • Thustrup Kreiner, C.
  • Pedersen, S.
  • Saez, E.
  • Econometrica, 79 (2011)(3), May, 651-92 ; p. 361-402
  • No taxation without information : deterrence and self-enforcement in the value added tax
  • Pomeranz, D.
  • American Economic Review, 105 (2015)(8), August, 2539-69 ; p. 403-433
  • Why can modern governments tax so much? An agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Thustrup Kreiner, C.
  • Saez, E.
  • Economica, 83(2016)(330), April, 219-46 ; p. 434-464
  • Information sharing and tax competition among governments
  • Bacchetta, P.
  • Paz Espinosa, M.
  • Journal of International Economics, 39(1995)(1-2), August, 103-21 ; p. 465-483
  • The missing wealth of nations : are Europe and the U.S. net debtors or net creditors?
  • Zucman, G.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2013)(3), 1321-64 ; p. 484-530
  • The general theory of tax avoidance
  • Stiglitz, J.E.
  • National Tax Journal, 38 (1985)(3), September, 325-37 ; p. 531-543
  • Retrospective capital gains taxation
  • Auerbach, A.J.
  • American Economic Review, 81(1991) (1), March, 167-78 ; p. 544-555
  • An economic analysis of anti tax avoidance doctrines
  • Weisbach, D.A.
  • American Law and Economics Review, 4 (2002)(1), Spring, 88-115 ; p. 556-586
  • Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (2006)(1), January, 145-79 ; p. 587-622
  • Corporate tax avoidance and firm value
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (2009)(3), August, 537-46 ; p. 623-631
  • What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement
  • Hanlon, M.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 93 (2009)(1-2), February, 126-41 ; p. 632-650
  • Fiscal paradise : foreign tax havens and American business
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Rice, E.M.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (1994)(1), February, 149-82 ; p. 651-684
  • International profit shifting within multinationals : a multi-country perspective
  • Huizinga, H.
  • Laeven, L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008)(5-6), June, 1164-82 ; p. 685-703
  • Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-shifting : evidence from European multinationals
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Riedel, N.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 97, (2013) January, 95-107 ; p. 704-717
  • Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax
  • Feldstein, M.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 81 (1999)(4), November, 674-80 ; p. 719-725
  • A general model of the behavioral response to taxation
  • Slemrod, J.
  • International Tax and Public Finance, 8 (2001)(2), March, 119-28 ; p. 726-735
  • Is the taxable income elasticity sufficient to calculate deadweight loss? The implications of evasion and avoidance
  • Chetty, R.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1 (2009)(2), August, 31-52 ; p. 736-760
  • An empirical test for tax evasion
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (1985)(2), May, 232-38 ; p. 761-767
  • Do taxpayers bunch at kink points?
  • Saez, E.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2010)(3), August, 180-212 ; p. 768-800
  • Production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity : theory and evidence from Pakistan
  • Best, M.C.
  • Brockmeyer, A.
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Spinnewijn, J.
  • Waseem, M.
  • Journal of Political Economy, 123 (2015)(6), October, 1311-55 ; p. 801-848
  • The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty
  • Andreoni, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 45 (1991) (2), 143-59 ; p. 849-865
  • Watch what I do, not what I say : the unintended consequences of the Homeland Investment Act
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Foley, C.F.
  • Forbes, K.J.
  • Journal of Finance, 66(2011)(3), June, 753-87 ; p. 866-902
  • The demand for tax haven operations
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Foley, C.F.
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Journal of Public Economics, 90 (2006)(3), March, 513-31 ; p. 903-921
  • Which countries become tax havens?
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Journal of Public Economics, 93 (2009)(9-10), October, 1058-68 ; p. 922-931
  • The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax haven crackdown
  • Johannesen, N.
  • Zucman, G.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (2014)(1), 65-91 ; p. 933-959
Extent
xxix, 959 p.
Isbn
9781785367441
Label
The economics of tax avoidance and evasion
Publication
Contents
  • Introduction
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • ; p. xv-xxix
  • Income tax evasion : a theoretical analysis
  • Allingham, M.G.
  • Sandmo, A.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 1(1972)(3-4), 323-38 ; p. 3-18
  • Tax evasion : a model
  • Srinivasan, T.N.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 2 (1973)(4), 339-46 ; p. 19-26
  • A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
  • Ytzhaki, S.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 3(1974) (2), 201-2 ; p. 27-28
  • Tax evasion and tax rates: an analysis of individual returns
  • Clotfelter, C. T.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV (1983)(3), August, 363-73 ; p. 31-41
  • An econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection
  • Feinstein, J.S.
  • RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1991)(1), Spring, 14-35 ; p. 42-63
  • Why do people pay taxes?
  • Alm, J.
  • McClelland, G.H.
  • Schulze, W. D.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 48 (1992)(1), June, 21-38 ; p. 64-81
  • Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit : evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Blumenthal, M.
  • Christian, C.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 79(2001)(3), March, 455-83 ; p. 82-110
  • Do normative appeals affect tax compliance? Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota?
  • Blumenthal, M.
  • Christian, C.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Smith, M.G.
  • National Tax Journal, 54 (2001)(1), March, 125-38 ; p. 111-125
  • Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
  • Reinganum, J.F.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 26(1985)(1), February, 1-18 ; p. 127-144
  • The tax compliance game : toward an interactive theory of law enforcement
  • Graetz, M.J.
  • Reinganum, J.F.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (1986)(1), Spring, 1-32 ; p. 145-176
  • A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement
  • Chander, P.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Review of Economic Studies, 65(1998)(1), January, 165-83 ; p. 177-197
  • The optimal size of a tax collection agency
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Yitzhaki, S.
  • Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89 (1987)(2), June, 183-92 ; p. 199-208
  • Corruption in tax administration
  • Chander, P.
  • Wilde, L.L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 49 (1992)(3), December, 333-49 ; p. 209-225
  • Tax policy and the missing middle : optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Wilson, J.D.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 95 (2011)(9-10), October, 1036-47 ; p. 226-237
  • Tax farming redux : experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
  • Khan, A.Q.
  • Khwaja, A.I.
  • Olken, B.A.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2016)(1), February, 219-71 ; p. 238-292
  • Optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion
  • Kaplow, L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 43 (1990)(2), November, 221-36 ; p. 293-308
  • Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax
  • Cremer, H.
  • Gahvari, F.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 60(1995) (2), May, 235-49 ; p. 309-326
  • Internal control versus external manipulation : a model of corporate income tax evasion
  • Chen, K.-P.
  • Chu, C.Y.C.
  • RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2005)(1), Spring, 151-64 ; p. 327-340
  • Corporate tax evasion with agency costs
  • Crocker, K.J.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 89(2005)(9 -10), September, 1593-610 ; p. 341-360
  • Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Knudsen, M.B.
  • Thustrup Kreiner, C.
  • Pedersen, S.
  • Saez, E.
  • Econometrica, 79 (2011)(3), May, 651-92 ; p. 361-402
  • No taxation without information : deterrence and self-enforcement in the value added tax
  • Pomeranz, D.
  • American Economic Review, 105 (2015)(8), August, 2539-69 ; p. 403-433
  • Why can modern governments tax so much? An agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Thustrup Kreiner, C.
  • Saez, E.
  • Economica, 83(2016)(330), April, 219-46 ; p. 434-464
  • Information sharing and tax competition among governments
  • Bacchetta, P.
  • Paz Espinosa, M.
  • Journal of International Economics, 39(1995)(1-2), August, 103-21 ; p. 465-483
  • The missing wealth of nations : are Europe and the U.S. net debtors or net creditors?
  • Zucman, G.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2013)(3), 1321-64 ; p. 484-530
  • The general theory of tax avoidance
  • Stiglitz, J.E.
  • National Tax Journal, 38 (1985)(3), September, 325-37 ; p. 531-543
  • Retrospective capital gains taxation
  • Auerbach, A.J.
  • American Economic Review, 81(1991) (1), March, 167-78 ; p. 544-555
  • An economic analysis of anti tax avoidance doctrines
  • Weisbach, D.A.
  • American Law and Economics Review, 4 (2002)(1), Spring, 88-115 ; p. 556-586
  • Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (2006)(1), January, 145-79 ; p. 587-622
  • Corporate tax avoidance and firm value
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (2009)(3), August, 537-46 ; p. 623-631
  • What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement
  • Hanlon, M.
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 93 (2009)(1-2), February, 126-41 ; p. 632-650
  • Fiscal paradise : foreign tax havens and American business
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Rice, E.M.
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (1994)(1), February, 149-82 ; p. 651-684
  • International profit shifting within multinationals : a multi-country perspective
  • Huizinga, H.
  • Laeven, L.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008)(5-6), June, 1164-82 ; p. 685-703
  • Earnings shocks and tax-motivated income-shifting : evidence from European multinationals
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Riedel, N.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 97, (2013) January, 95-107 ; p. 704-717
  • Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax
  • Feldstein, M.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 81 (1999)(4), November, 674-80 ; p. 719-725
  • A general model of the behavioral response to taxation
  • Slemrod, J.
  • International Tax and Public Finance, 8 (2001)(2), March, 119-28 ; p. 726-735
  • Is the taxable income elasticity sufficient to calculate deadweight loss? The implications of evasion and avoidance
  • Chetty, R.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1 (2009)(2), August, 31-52 ; p. 736-760
  • An empirical test for tax evasion
  • Slemrod, J.
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (1985)(2), May, 232-38 ; p. 761-767
  • Do taxpayers bunch at kink points?
  • Saez, E.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (2010)(3), August, 180-212 ; p. 768-800
  • Production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity : theory and evidence from Pakistan
  • Best, M.C.
  • Brockmeyer, A.
  • Kleven, H.J.
  • Spinnewijn, J.
  • Waseem, M.
  • Journal of Political Economy, 123 (2015)(6), October, 1311-55 ; p. 801-848
  • The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty
  • Andreoni, J.
  • Journal of Public Economics, 45 (1991) (2), 143-59 ; p. 849-865
  • Watch what I do, not what I say : the unintended consequences of the Homeland Investment Act
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Foley, C.F.
  • Forbes, K.J.
  • Journal of Finance, 66(2011)(3), June, 753-87 ; p. 866-902
  • The demand for tax haven operations
  • Desai, M.A.
  • Foley, C.F.
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Journal of Public Economics, 90 (2006)(3), March, 513-31 ; p. 903-921
  • Which countries become tax havens?
  • Dharmapala, D.
  • Hines, J.R. (Jr.)
  • Journal of Public Economics, 93 (2009)(9-10), October, 1058-68 ; p. 922-931
  • The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax haven crackdown
  • Johannesen, N.
  • Zucman, G.
  • American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (2014)(1), 65-91 ; p. 933-959
Extent
xxix, 959 p.
Isbn
9781785367441

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    • IBFD Library AmsterdamBorrow it
      Rietlandpark 301, Amsterdam, 1019 DW, NL
      52.37366609999999 4.9336932
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