The Resource Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
Resource Information
The item Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Summary
- The article is about the comparison of OECD transfer pricing rules on entitlement to intangible revenues with solutions suggested by the Economics of contracts and Principal-Agent models. The goal is to check whether the OECD's anti-abuse rule assigning intangible revenues to the developer and not to the funder, when funder lacks ability to monitor developing activity, actually enforces conditions that independent parties would agree upon, as it should be under the arm's-length principle (ALP). The conclusion is that the OECD rules clash with cconomic principles
- Language
- eng
- Label
- Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
- Title
- Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- The article is about the comparison of OECD transfer pricing rules on entitlement to intangible revenues with solutions suggested by the Economics of contracts and Principal-Agent models. The goal is to check whether the OECD's anti-abuse rule assigning intangible revenues to the developer and not to the funder, when funder lacks ability to monitor developing activity, actually enforces conditions that independent parties would agree upon, as it should be under the arm's-length principle (ALP). The conclusion is that the OECD rules clash with cconomic principles
- Citation source
- In: International tax journal. - Riverwoods. - Vol. 43 (2017), no. 6 (November-December) ; p. 37-43, 54-55
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Musselli, A
- Geographic coverage
- North America
- Language note
- English
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
- transfer pricing
- anti-avoidance
- intangibles
- arm's length principle
- Label
- Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
- Label
- Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.library.ibfd.org/portal/Intangible-revenues-assigned-to-the-developer-and/PW3miMlsFow/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.library.ibfd.org/portal/Intangible-revenues-assigned-to-the-developer-and/PW3miMlsFow/">Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.library.ibfd.org/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.library.ibfd.org/">International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation</a></span></span></span></span></div>
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.library.ibfd.org/portal/Intangible-revenues-assigned-to-the-developer-and/PW3miMlsFow/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.library.ibfd.org/portal/Intangible-revenues-assigned-to-the-developer-and/PW3miMlsFow/">Intangible revenues assigned to the developer and not to the funder lacking "development monitoring staff" : OECD transfer pricing anti-abuse rule clashes with economics of contracts</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.library.ibfd.org/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.library.ibfd.org/">International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation</a></span></span></span></span></div>
